IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/ety/journl/v37y2012i1p33-58.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Del individuo racional al individuo con creencias, un mecanismo de elección

Author

Listed:
  • Oscar Rogelio Caloca Osorio.

    (Departamento de Economía de la Universidad Autónoma Metropolitana- Azcapotzalco.)

Abstract

En la presente investigación se hace una comparación entre el individuo racional y el individuo “creencial”, enfocando la temática en torno a la creencia racional condicionada por la incertidumbre externa e interna -esta última observada a través de la regla de Jeffrey- con la finalidad de establecer un juego donde la resolución final implica un mecanismo de elección de estrategias por parte de los jugadores, con base en un entorno de incertidumbre externa e interna. Se señala que la diferencia fundamental entre un individuo racional y un individuo “creencial” es la probabilidad de que el segundo elija irracionalmente, con un grado de certeza nulo. Esto es, a través de la especulación.

Suggested Citation

  • Oscar Rogelio Caloca Osorio., 2012. "Del individuo racional al individuo con creencias, un mecanismo de elección," Economía: teoría y práctica, Universidad Autónoma Metropolitana, México, vol. 37(2), pages 33-58, Julio-Dic.
  • Handle: RePEc:ety:journl:v:37:y:2012:i:1:p:33-58
    DOI: 10.24275/ETYPUAM/NE/372012/Caloca
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.24275/ETYPUAM/NE/372012/Caloca
    Download Restriction: no

    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.24275/ETYPUAM/NE/372012/Caloca?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    More about this item

    Keywords

    elección económica; creencia racional; teoría de juegos; incertidumbre; regla de Jeffrey.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • B41 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - Economic Methodology - - - Economic Methodology
    • C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
    • D03 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Behavioral Microeconomics: Underlying Principles

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ety:journl:v:37:y:2012:i:1:p:33-58. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Georgina Alenka Guzmán Chávez (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/etyuamx.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.