Financial institution default frequencies and takeover defenses
Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to examine the relationship between estimated default frequencies (EDFs) and a government index that proxies for takeover defense provisions for publicly-traded financial institutions from 2002 to 2004. Design/methodology/approach – Using a sample of publicly-traded financial institutions, the effect of anti-takeover provisions on EDFs was analyzed. Findings – It was found that financial institutions with multiple takeover defenses tend to have lower EDFs compared with those with fewer takeover defenses. This result is robust to a variety of specifications and is supportive of the wealth distribution hypothesis. Further, it appears that the result is primarily driven by non-depository institutions. This may imply that regulation of depository institutions mitigates takeover defense effects on managerial behavior. Originality/value – This paper adds to the corporate finance literature, which reports mixed findings on the relationships between takeover defenses and firm value.
Volume (Year): 24 (2007)
Issue (Month): 4 (September)
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://www.emeraldinsight.com |
|Order Information:|| Postal: Emerald Group Publishing, Howard House, Wagon Lane, Bingley, BD16 1WA, UK|
Web: http://emeraldgrouppublishing.com/products/journals/journals.htm?id=sef Email:
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eme:sefpps:v:24:y:2007:i:4:p:286-296. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Louise Lister)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.