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Investment decisions and bank loan contracting

Author

Listed:
  • Wenxia Ge
  • Tony Kang
  • Gerald J. Lobo
  • Byron Y. Song

Abstract

Purpose - The purpose of this paper is to examine how a firm’s investment behavior relates to its subsequent bank loan contracting. Design/methodology/approach - Using a sample of US firms during the period 1992-2011, the authors examine the association between overinvestment (underinvestment) and three characteristics of bank loan contracts: loan spread, collateral requirement, and loan maturity. Findings - The authors find that overinvesting firms obtain loans with higher loan spreads. Additional tests show that the effect of overinvestment on loan spreads is generally more pronounced in firms with lower reputation, weaker shareholder rights, and lower institutional ownership. The effect of overinvestment on collateral requirement is mixed, and investment efficiency has no significant relation to loan maturity. Research limitations/implications - The results are subject to the following caveats. First, while the study provides empirical evidence that investment efficiency affects bank loan contracting terms, especially the cost of bank loans, the underlying theory is not well-developed. The authors leave it up to future research to provide a theoretical framework to clearly distinguish the cash flow and credit risk effects of past investment behavior from those of existing agency conflicts. Second, due to data limitation, the sample size is small, especially when the authors control for corporate governance measured byG-indexand institutional ownership. Practical implications - The finding that overinvestment is costly to corporations suggests that managers should consider the potential trade-offs from such investment decisions carefully. The evidence also alerts shareholders and board members to the importance of monitoring management investment decisions. In addition, the authors find that corporate governance moderates the relationship between investment decisions and cost of bank loans, suggesting that it would be beneficial to design effective governance mechanisms to prevent management from empire building and motivate managers to pursue efficient investment strategies. Originality/value - First, the findings enhance understanding of the potential economic consequences of overinvestment decisions in the context of a firm’s private debt contracting. The evidence suggests that lenders perceive higher credit risk from overinvestment than from underinvestment, likely because firms squander cash in the current period by investing in (negative net present value) projects that are likely to result in future cash flow problems. Second, the study contributes to the literature on the determinants of bank loans by identifying an observable empirical proxy for uncertainty in future cash flows that increases credit risk.

Suggested Citation

  • Wenxia Ge & Tony Kang & Gerald J. Lobo & Byron Y. Song, 2017. "Investment decisions and bank loan contracting," Asian Review of Accounting, Emerald Group Publishing Limited, vol. 25(2), pages 262-287, May.
  • Handle: RePEc:eme:arapps:ara-03-2016-0027
    DOI: 10.1108/ARA-03-2016-0027
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Ashraf, Badar Nadeem & Qian, Ningyu & Shen, Yinjie (Victor), 2021. "The impact of trade and financial openness on bank loan pricing: Evidence from emerging economies," Emerging Markets Review, Elsevier, vol. 47(C).
    2. Ballester, Laura & González-Urteaga, Ana & Martínez, Beatriz, 2020. "The role of internal corporate governance mechanisms on default risk: A systematic review for different institutional settings," Research in International Business and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 54(C).
    3. Badar Nadeem Ashraf, 2021. "Is Economic Uncertainty a Risk Factor in Bank Loan Pricing Decisions? International Evidence," Risks, MDPI, vol. 9(5), pages 1-17, April.

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