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Financiamiento y provisión de bienes públicos. Un modelo de negociación

Listed author(s):
  • Jorge Ibarra Salazar

    (Profesor asociado, Departamento de Economía, Instituto Tecnológico y de Estudios Superiores de Monterrey (ITESM), Campus Monterrey. Monterrey, N.L. Mexico.)

  • Laura Razzolini

    (Assistant Professor, Department of Economics and Finance, The University of Mississippi. University, MS. USA.)

In this paper we represent the process of financing and providing public goods with a fulI-information bargaining model where both supply and demand sides are explicitly considered. In this bargaining process a consumer-voter and a bureaucrat negotiate the level of provision and the total tax-payment of the public good. After characterizing the feasible set of transactions and defining the efficient set of outcomes, we consider the generalized Nash bargaining solution for this game. We find that the observed result depends upon the negotiation strength of the players and that in general it will be a compromise between the extreme cases analyzed in the literature.

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Article provided by in its journal Economia Mexicana NUEVA EPOCA.

Volume (Year): VIII (1999)
Issue (Month): 1 (January-June)
Pages: 149-168

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Handle: RePEc:emc:ecomex:v:8:y:1999:i:1:p:149-168
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