IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/ekz/ekonoz/2008213.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Grupos piramidales y deuda en España

Author

Listed:
  • Inmaculada Aguiar Díaz

    (Universidad de Las Palmas de Gran Canaria)

  • Domingo Javier Santana Martín

    (UUniversidad de Las Palmas de Gran Canaria)

Abstract

This paper analyses the relationship regarding the divergence between the voting rights and cash flows in the hands of the main shareholder of a pyramidal group with a level of indebtedness. The outcome obtained from a sample of Spanish non financial quoted companies in the 1996-2006 period enables us to assert that the control of a company by a pyramidal group affects in a negative way on the financial indebtedness level. At the same time, the bigger divergence, the less indebtedness. In this sense, the outcomes reveal the use of pyramidal groups as an income expropriation mechanism. This can be a reflection of the reduction in the demand (tunnelling effect) and/or supply (anticipation effect) of alien resources, due to the search for private profits by the managing shareholders in detriment of the minority owners’ interests.

Suggested Citation

  • Inmaculada Aguiar Díaz & Domingo Javier Santana Martín, 2008. "Grupos piramidales y deuda en España," EKONOMIAZ. Revista vasca de Economía, Gobierno Vasco / Eusko Jaurlaritza / Basque Government, vol. 68(02), pages 288-309.
    • Handle: RePEc:ekz:ekonoz:2008213
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.ogasun.ejgv.euskadi.net/r51-k86aekon/es/k86aEkonomiazWar/ekonomiaz/downloadPDF?R01HNoPortal=true&idpubl=63®istro=927
    File Function: complete text
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    More about this item

    Keywords

    pyramids; divergence; debt; vote rights; cash flow rights;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ekz:ekonoz:2008213. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Iñaki Treviño (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/debages.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.