Wage Determination and Capital Decisions in a Dynamic Monopoly Union Model
This paper uses a dynamic monopoly union model to analyse the joint determination of wages, employment and investment in the absence of binding contracts. The union maximizes a utilitarian utility function while the firm faces a neoclassical investment problem with adjustment costs. Concentrating on noncommitment equilibria, we solve for Markov strategies. When the model is tested for Greek manufacturing during the period 1954-1993, the data do not reject the theoretical predictions.
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Volume (Year): 2 (1998)
Issue (Month): 1 (Summer)
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