Union Objectives, Wage Setting Externalities and Structural Constraints
A prominent strand of literature featuring large monopoly unions and monopolistically competitive goods markets has concluded that design of the monetary regime can influence equilibrium unemployment as well as inflation. In this paper, it is shown that this non-neutrality result crucially hinges on the assumption that, prior to entering wage negotiations, unions do not formulate real wage and employment objectives that are jointly feasible, in the sense that they are consistent with the set of possible labour-market outcomes implied by the underlying economic structure.
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Volume (Year): 13 (2010)
Issue (Month): 1 (Summer)
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