Virtuous outcomes of instrumental intentions? The case of Uruguay’s 1996 constitutional reform

In December 1996 a national referendum approved a constitutional reform that introduced substantial changes to Uruguay’s electoral system. We argue that this reform was proposed by Uruguay’s establishment parties to prevent the rise to power of the left-wing Frente Amplio in the 1999 elections. While successful in this instrumental goal, the policy introduced a series of changes that, paradoxically, would pave the way for a long period of Frente Amplio rule after 2004. It also facilitated the coalition formation process within the centre-right block in the last decade. In the pursuit of a short-term electoral victory, proponent parties created an institutional setting that would support Uruguay’s relative political success in the first quarter of the XXI century. We argue that this reform is an example of instrumental mismatch: the private goals of the reformers were orthogonal to the reforms stated goals. We argue that this mismatch need not be an obstacle for a reform’s ultimate success.