Port-shipping collaboration and investment strategies under cross-shareholding

This study employs game-theoretic models to analyze the performance of cross-shareholding (CS), Port Self-Investment (PI), and Profit-Sharing with Liner Investment (PS) in port-shipping supply chains, examining the impacts of different collaboration modes on pricing strategies, investment levels, and supply chain member profits. The research finds that the cross-shareholding mechanism effectively promotes deep collaboration between ports and liner companies, coordinating their interest conflicts, particularly under high investment difficulty where cooperative agreements are more easily reached. Compared to traditional investment models, cross-shareholding demonstrates significant advantages in enhancing overall supply chain efficiency and social benefits, especially under scenarios of high investment difficulty and low profit-sharing ratios. Furthermore, the study reveals the relationship between market power distribution among port-shipping supply chain members and collaboration modes, indicating that cooperation willingness diminishes when either ports or liner companies hold dominant bargaining power, whereas cross-shareholding becomes more feasible when both parties possess comparable economic scales. Ultimately, this research provides theoretical support for capital collaboration in port-shipping supply chains and offers actionable recommendations for policymakers to foster resilience and advance sustainable development within the industry.