A pareto optimum congestion reduction scheme
This article shows that certain congestion reduction schemes have the potential for not penalizing anyone. The traditional social welfare approach is modified to address the distribution of gains and losses across the population. As a first step in this line of research, we consider a transportation system where congestion delay is simply given by a function of its user flow. We show that a particular pricing scheme with variable tolls, that can be viewed as hybrid between rationing and pricing, can benefit everyone (unlike pure pricing alone) even if the collected revenues are not returned to the population. The simple conditions under which this is possible are identified. Few data are needed to choose a beneficial policy. Examples are given.
Volume (Year): 29 (1995)
Issue (Month): 2 (April)
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/wps/find/journaldescription.cws_home/548/description#description|
|Order Information:|| Postal: http://www.elsevier.com/wps/find/supportfaq.cws_home/regional|
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:transb:v:29:y:1995:i:2:p:139-154. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.