Intention-based fairness preferences in multi-partner project teams

We propose a stylized model of cooperative effort expenditure in multi-agent teams which is driven by intention-based preferences for fairness. Differing from preferences about material payoffs, we consider agents with intention-based preferences for fairness who also care about the motivation that drives other agents’ actions. In the spirit of Rabin (1993), we define the agent's kindness to other agents in terms of how much more or less than other agents’ equitable payoff that agent believes she is giving to the other agent. In a series of propositions, we compare to each other two kinds of agents: “selfish” agents who are only motivated to maximize their material payoffs, and “unselfish” agents who are also motivated by considerations of intention-based fairness to their co-workers. Our analysis shows that the effect of intention-based fairness preferences on the agents’ cooperative effort expenditure depends critically on the effort cost of the agents and on major attributes of the project. Additionally, the intention-based fairness preference may change the way that the project attributes influence the agents’ cooperative effort choices. We conclude the paper by proposing recommendations for enhancing cooperation of the agents in project teams.