IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/soceco/v122y2026ics2214804326000364.html

Minimum-effort game under stochastic monitoring

Author

Listed:
  • Qu, Yiwei

Abstract

In this paper, I designed a coordination device in minimum-effort games called “stochastic monitoring” and tested its effectiveness in the lab. This device is characterized by: (1) stochastic (negative) material consequences, and (2) non-deterrence, in the sense that the coordination device does not remove any pure-strategy Nash equilibria in the basic minimum-effort game. The results show that stochastic monitoring significantly improved coordination among groups stuck at inefficient outcomes. This effect was stronger under a relatively high punishment, low monitoring probability scheme compared to other low punishment, high probability alternatives. Further analysis reveals that stochastic monitoring functioned as a coordination device, despite having the feature of material incentives.

Suggested Citation

  • Qu, Yiwei, 2026. "Minimum-effort game under stochastic monitoring," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 122(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:soceco:v:122:y:2026:i:c:s2214804326000364
    DOI: 10.1016/j.socec.2026.102545
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2214804326000364
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1016/j.socec.2026.102545?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to

    for a different version of it.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    ;
    ;
    ;
    ;

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:soceco:v:122:y:2026:i:c:s2214804326000364. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/620175 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.