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Collusion-proof decentralized autonomous organizations

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  • Braun, Alexander
  • Haeusle, Niklas

Abstract

A first-order design task in blockchain-based decentralized autonomous organizations is to ensure that malicious actors are sanctioned. We show that, when voters act strategically and the system is insufficiently decentralized, payoff-matching bribes undermine the sanctioning of malicious actors under conventional governance. Our framework formalizes DAO voting mechanisms and lets us identify those that mitigate the problem. Stochastic voting decouples a tokenholder’s influence from the voting behavior of others. Thus, bribery-proofness can be restored in the presence of sufficiently centralized governance tokenholders. Alternatively, masked voting increases resilience against bribery. Our work contributes to the broader debate on the merits and pitfalls of decentralization and highlights the need to align governance mechanisms with the degree of decentralization in blockchain networks.

Suggested Citation

  • Braun, Alexander & Haeusle, Niklas, 2026. "Collusion-proof decentralized autonomous organizations," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 55(7).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:respol:v:55:y:2026:i:7:s0048733326001009
    DOI: 10.1016/j.respol.2026.105509
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