To be or not to be cooperative: Exploring the post-disaster recovery game among interdependent infrastructure networks

Post-disaster recovery of interdependent infrastructures presents significant challenges, exacerbated by the complex decision-making dynamics among decentralized decision-makers. However, existing analytical models fail to capture real-world negotiation-based inter-sectoral cooperative behaviors, restricting their ability to fully capture and evaluate the potential benefits achievable through collaborative recovery strategies. To address this deficiency and capture cooperative opportunities, this study proposes a government-guided cooperative framework that integrates the Nash Bargaining (NB) model and a financial compensation mechanism into the recovery decision problem. The proposed framework also includes an outer approximation-based method to solve the computational challenges inherent in solving the NB problem. A comprehensive case study on Shelby County, TN, is conducted to validate the proposed framework, using a non-cooperative framework as a baseline for comparison. The results robustly demonstrate that cooperative behavior significantly improves overall system recovery efficiency. Furthermore, the findings highlight that the cooperative strategy disproportionately benefits subordinate agents and provides financial compensation for the dominant agents, leading to a more equitable distribution of recovery burden compared to non-cooperative strategy. This work advances the understanding of decentralized infrastructure management by providing a tangible roadmap that guides decision-makers in fostering collaborative strategies for more efficient and equitable post-disaster recovery.