Author
Listed:
- Peng, Xiangzhen
- Zheng, Chengliang
- Shi, Jianyu
- Cui, Xiaohui
Abstract
The architecture of Industrial Control Systems (ICS) has evolved into an integrated cyber-physical system, introducing covert, zero-dynamic cyberattack vectors that threaten the reliability of ICS. We address two issues: (1) how to use decentralized solutions to defend resource-constrained ICS against highly covert zero-dynamic attacks; (2) how to improve performance (meeting real-time, high-frequency interaction demands) while enhancing reliability via decentralization. We propose a defense model integrating blockchain, zero-knowledge proofs, and smart contract (SC) obfuscation to bolster ICS resilience. A customized zk-SNARK algorithm enables efficient identity authentication, completed in under 3 ms. The Garble framework obfuscates SCs, concealing ICS device IP addresses and disrupting attack chains. A blockchain acts as a secure intermediary between the engineer workstation (EW) and programmable logic controller (PLC). To reduce blockchain overhead, we refine a proportional–integral–derivative (PID)–based roulette wheel algorithm. Obfuscated SCs resist decompilation by tools such as Objdump, ensuring robust protection. Our node selection mechanism balances security and diversity, mitigating systemic biases like the Matthew effect. By leveraging blockchain to supply computational power for encrypting and protecting ICS data flows, we offer new insights into defending ICS against highly covert cyberattacks. Experimental evaluation validates the model’s effectiveness under real-world ICS scenarios.
Suggested Citation
Peng, Xiangzhen & Zheng, Chengliang & Shi, Jianyu & Cui, Xiaohui, 2026.
"A decentralized defense model for covert zero-dynamic attacks in industrial control systems,"
Reliability Engineering and System Safety, Elsevier, vol. 265(PA).
Handle:
RePEc:eee:reensy:v:265:y:2026:i:pa:s0951832025006830
DOI: 10.1016/j.ress.2025.111483
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