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The unintended consequences of accountability: Quasi-experimental evidence from policing in Pakistan

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Listed:
  • Ahmed, Hamna
  • Haider, Dareen
  • Vyborny, Kate

Abstract

We investigate data manipulation in the principal-agent relationship using administrative microdata from the police in Pakistan. We find that police are less likely to register citizens’ crime reports in areas where political accountability pressure is higher because the governing party holds a particular constituency. We report a series of tests to rule out the possibility that this result is explained by increased crime prevention. The results are consistent with officials deciding not to register some reports, under pressure to keep crime statistics low. As a new crime reports tracking database is rolled out, improving observability, the number of registered crimes increases.

Suggested Citation

  • Ahmed, Hamna & Haider, Dareen & Vyborny, Kate, 2026. "The unintended consequences of accountability: Quasi-experimental evidence from policing in Pakistan," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 258(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:258:y:2026:i:c:s0047272726000502
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2026.105614
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    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
    • H40 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - General

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