Is it wise for cross-border e-commerce platforms to bear estimated imported charges on behalf of consumers?

Estimated import charges significantly influence consumer behavior toward imported products, creating a strategic dilemma for cross-border e-commerce platforms (e-platforms). Adopting a tax-exclusive strategy (E) helps control costs but risks losing consumers who are sensitive to additional import charges. In contrast, although a tax-inclusive strategy (I) enhances consumers' willingness to purchase, it also increases the import charge burden on e-platforms. To examine this trade-off, we develop a stylized cross-border e-commerce supply chain model consisting of a foreign brand owner and two asymmetric e-platforms, where e-platform A has a higher demand potential than e-platform B. Four strategy profiles arise from the e-platforms’ strategic choices: EE, EI, IE, and II. The results indicate that when an e-platform adopts the tax-inclusive strategy, its retail price rises, with the increase reflecting all or part of the import charges. Moreover, e-platform B with a lower demand potential has a stronger incentive to adopt the tax-inclusive strategy. We also derive sufficient conditions under which the Nash equilibria of the tax-inclusive strategy game correspond to EE, EI, and II, while IE cannot emerge as a Nash equilibrium. Furthermore, we identify conflict regions where the e-platforms’ Nash equilibria misalign with the brand owner's preferred outcomes. To address the misalignments arising from the coexistence of EE and II equilibria, we propose an equilibrium selection mechanism that incorporates transfer payments and subsidy incentives. This mechanism achieves a “win–win–win” outcome for the brand owner and both e-platforms.