Coordination of supply chain contracts on blockchain platforms

To promote the application of blockchain technology in the supply chain, this paper examines a model consisting of a manufacturer and a retailer, with the manufacturer acting as the leader. Game models are established under four different scenarios: the manufacturer independently bears the blockchain application costs, shares the costs with the retailer, negotiates revenue sharing through the Nash bargaining mechanism, and shares revenue through centralised decision-making. The optimal coordination mechanism is identified by analysing the equilibrium in each scenario. Compared to the scenario where the manufacturer bears the costs independently, under the cost structure studied, the cost-sharing contract cannot change the situation where supply chain members take their own marginal profits as their decision-making goal, resulting in coordination failure; the revenue-sharing contract under the bargaining mechanism can increase the overall profit of the supply chain but may reduce the retailer’s profit. In contrast, revenue-sharing based on centralised decision-making can yield the highest profits for all parties. Interestingly, when consumers are insensitive to information quality, an increase in the initial information level may reduce consumer welfare and even lower social welfare. This study provides valuable insights for supply chain members on coordinating contract mechanisms to support the use of blockchain technology.