IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/poleco/v92y2026ics0176268025000357.html

Electoral corruption cycles: Separating perceptions and experiences across households and experts

Author

Listed:
  • Crombach, Lamar

Abstract

Existing research established that experts perceive corruption as more severe during democratic elections. This study exploits a novel decomposable corruption index in a panel of 45 democracies between 2004–2020 to assess whether this also holds for household perceptions and experiences. The results show that elections are unrelated to household corruption experiences, challenging the notion of electoral experience corruption cycles. As with experts, household corruption perceptions are affected by elections, yet households perceive less corruption. These findings highlight the need to distinguish between household and expert perceptions as well as between perceptions and experiences.

Suggested Citation

  • Crombach, Lamar, 2026. "Electoral corruption cycles: Separating perceptions and experiences across households and experts," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 92(C).
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:poleco:v:92:y:2026:i:c:s0176268025000357
    DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102675
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0176268025000357
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102675?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to

    for a different version of it.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    ;
    ;
    ;
    ;
    ;
    ;

    JEL classification:

    • C23 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Single Equation Models; Single Variables - - - Models with Panel Data; Spatio-temporal Models
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
    • E02 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - General - - - Institutions and the Macroeconomy
    • H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
    • K40 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - General

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:poleco:v:92:y:2026:i:c:s0176268025000357. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505544 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.