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Re-election incentives and the adoption of early childhood development programmes: The case of the "Happy Child" Programme in Brazil

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  • Tebaldi, Raquel
  • Gassmann, Franziska
  • Martorano, Bruno

Abstract

What incentives matter for governments to adopt pro-poor early childhood development (ECD) policies? This paper addresses this question by employing a regression discontinuity design (RDD) to study the effect of mayoral re-election incentives on the adoption of the “Happy Child” ECD Programme in Brazil. The analysis finds that municipalities with first-term mayors (those that were eligible for re-election for another consecutive mandate) had a higher probability of programme adoption by 2018 of over 10 percentage points. These results confirm theoretical expectations about the role of re-election incentives and provide a significant contribution on the institutional determinants of the expansion of ECD programmes in developing countries.

Suggested Citation

  • Tebaldi, Raquel & Gassmann, Franziska & Martorano, Bruno, 2026. "Re-election incentives and the adoption of early childhood development programmes: The case of the "Happy Child" Programme in Brazil," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 92(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:poleco:v:92:y:2026:i:c:s0176268024001186
    DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2024.102616
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    References listed on IDEAS

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