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The structure of adaptive competition in minority games

Author

Listed:
  • Manuca, Radu
  • Li, Yi
  • Riolo, Rick
  • Savit, Robert

Abstract

In this paper we present results and analyses of a class of games in which heterogeneous agents are rewarded for being in a minority group. Each agent possesses a number of fixed strategies each of which are predictors of the next minority group. The strategies use a set of aggregate, publicly available information (reflecting the agents’ collective previous decisions) to make their predictions. An agent chooses which group to join at a given moment by using one of his strategies. These games are adaptive in that agents can choose, at different points of the game, to exercise different strategies in making their choice of which group to join. The games are not evolutionary in that the agents’ strategies are fixed at the beginning of the game. We find, rather generally, that such systems evidence a phase change from a maladaptive, informationally efficient phase in which the system performs poorly at generating resources, to an inefficient phase in which there is an emergent cooperation among the agents, and the system more effectively generates resources. The best emergent coordination is achieved in a transition region between these two phases. This transition occurs when the dimension of the strategy space is of the order of the number of agents playing the game. We present explanations for this general behavior, based in part on an information theoretic analysis of the system and its publicly available information. We also propose a mean-field-like model of the game which is most accurate in the maladaptive, efficient phase. In addition, we show that the best individual agent performance in the two different phases is achieved by sets of strategies with markedly different characteristics. We discuss implications of our results for various aspects of the study of complex adaptive systems.

Suggested Citation

  • Manuca, Radu & Li, Yi & Riolo, Rick & Savit, Robert, 2000. "The structure of adaptive competition in minority games," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 282(3), pages 559-608.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:phsmap:v:282:y:2000:i:3:p:559-608
    DOI: 10.1016/S0378-4371(00)00100-X
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Kets, W., 2007. "The Minority Game : An Economics Perspective," Discussion Paper 2007-53, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    2. Liu, Ching & Liaw, Sy-Sang, 2006. "Maximize personal gain in the minority game," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 360(2), pages 516-524.
    3. Płatkowski, Tadeusz & Ramsza, Michał, 2003. "Playing minority game," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 323(C), pages 726-734.
    4. Kei Katahira & Yu Chen & Gaku Hashimoto & Hiroshi Okuda, 2019. "Development of an agent-based speculation game for higher reproducibility of financial stylized facts," Papers 1902.02040, arXiv.org.
    5. repec:eee:phsmap:v:524:y:2019:i:c:p:503-518 is not listed on IDEAS
    6. Hung, Chia-Hsiang & Liaw, Sy-Sang, 2007. "Effective history length of the minority game," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 382(1), pages 129-137.
    7. Kei Katahira & Yu Chen, 2019. "Heterogeneous wealth distribution, round-trip trading and the emergence of volatility clustering in Speculation Game," Papers 1909.03185, arXiv.org.
    8. Acosta, Gabriel & Caridi, Inés & Guala, Sebastián & Marenco, Javier, 2012. "The Full Strategy Minority Game," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 391(1), pages 217-230.
    9. Acosta, Gabriel & Caridi, Inés & Guala, Sebastián & Marenco, Javier, 2013. "The quasi-periodicity of the minority game revisited," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 392(19), pages 4450-4465.
    10. Liaw, Sy-Sang & Liu, Ching, 2005. "The quasi-periodic time sequence of the population in minority game," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 351(2), pages 571-579.

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