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Shadow banking coordinated supervision and systemic risk control: Empirical evidence from the New Asset Management Regulation

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  • Zhang, Siyu
  • Miao, Wenlong
  • Xu, Haoran

Abstract

In order to strengthen the management of shadow banking and make up for the shortcomings of separate supervision, several Chinese departments jointly issued the New Asset Management Regulation in 2018. Combined with the original policy text of the New Asset Management Regulation, this study regards it as a quasi-natural experiment of shadow banking coordinated supervision. Based on the generalized Difference-in-Differences model, we find that the coordinated regulatory policy on shadow banking significantly controls systemic financial risk by reducing risk accumulation and weakening risk contagion. The information quality effect and the financial governance effect enhance this risk control effect. At the same time, the impact of the shadow banking coordinated supervision is more significant on non-bank financial institutions, highly profitable institutions, and those subject to stronger external supervision. Our study enriches the understanding of the implementation effects of the New Asset Management Regulation, and provides practical experience in shadow banking regulation for other developing countries and emerging economies from the perspective of collaborative supervision.

Suggested Citation

  • Zhang, Siyu & Miao, Wenlong & Xu, Haoran, 2026. "Shadow banking coordinated supervision and systemic risk control: Empirical evidence from the New Asset Management Regulation," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 97(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:pacfin:v:97:y:2026:i:c:s0927538x26000491
    DOI: 10.1016/j.pacfin.2026.103103
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