Author
Listed:
- Zhang, Huan
- Wu, Jiaming
- Chen, Sien
- Jiang, Jianli
Abstract
Renewable portfolio standards (RPSs) are critical policy instruments for facilitating the low-carbon transition in the power sector. The allocation of RPS obligations between the supply side and demand side substantially influences policy effectiveness and the operational efficiency of power supply chain networks (PSCNs). To systematically examine the different impacts of these two allocation mechanisms, we develop a PSCN equilibrium model by incorporating tradable green certificates (TGCs) under RPS constraints. Comparative analysis is conducted using empirical data from Jiangsu Province in China. The model elucidates the multi-agent decision-making processes and interactive mechanisms within PSCNs under distinct RPS obligation regimes, and quantitatively evaluates the economic, environmental, and social welfare implications for each participant. The results reveal that the supply-side RPS allocation exerts a stronger incentive effect on renewable power generation, substantially promoting output and capacity expansion. By contrast, the demand-side allocation is more conducive to safeguarding consumer welfare, enhancing pricing flexibility in the electricity market, and improving the overall operational efficiency of the PSCN, thereby yielding higher social welfare. The findings obtained in this study elucidate the underlying mechanisms that allow RPS obligation allocation to affect the performance of PSCNs, as well as providing theoretical insights into designing differentiated RPS policies, refining the TGC trading mechanism, and advancing the high-quality development of regional power industries.
Suggested Citation
Zhang, Huan & Wu, Jiaming & Chen, Sien & Jiang, Jianli, 2026.
"Effects of renewable portfolio standards obligation distribution: Equilibrium analysis of supply side vs. demand side in power supply chain networks,"
Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 101(C).
Handle:
RePEc:eee:juipol:v:101:y:2026:i:c:s0957178726000664
DOI: 10.1016/j.jup.2026.102207
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