Pricing and financing strategies for start-ups’ innovative product: Dynamic game analysis based on consumer value co-creation

This study explores the influence of consumer value co-creation behavior on the pricing and financing strategies of start-ups developing innovative products. A dynamic Stackelberg game model is developed to analyze strategic interactions between start-ups and consumers under three financing modes: bank financing, reward-based crowdfunding, and a hybrid of both. In single-financing modes, optimal pricing increases with consumer preference for innovation and the corporation's emphasis on consumer value but decreases with the market interest rate. This relationship holds only when the R&D cost coefficient is relatively low. When it is high or consumer preference is weak, start-ups tend to shift from bank financing to reward-based crowdfunding as the consumer co-creation effort level increases. Critical thresholds emerge, where reward-based crowdfunding becomes optimal when the consumer co-creation effort level aligns with the innovation success rate. Conversely, bank financing remains preferable under low innovation success rates or high financial rigidity. In the hybrid mode, increasing the proportion of crowdfunding stabilizes profitability, balancing capital flexibility and risk. Numerical simulations and case illustrations validate how variations in consumer co-creation effort level, R&D cost coefficient, and other key parameters influence optimal pricing and financing strategies. Local sensitivity analysis and robustness checks demonstrate the stability of strategic thresholds and financing transitions. Ultimately, start-ups should adopt flexible financing strategies reflecting consumer co-creation dynamics and market conditions. These findings offer theoretical and managerial implications for innovation-driven corporations operating in participatory platform environments.