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Spillover effects from competitive rank-and-yank systems on employees' other-regarding behavior11Authors have contributed equally and are listed alphabetically. We thank seminar participants at the University of Arizona and Texas Tech University, and conference participants at the 2021 and 2022 Economics Science Association meeting and the 2022 International Conference on Social Dilemmas for helpful comments and suggestions. All data and a full copy of all the experimental materials, including instructions and screenshots, are available on OSF via the following link: https://osf.io/9hu4n/?view_only=35704c5988c3422c9c8cf5850ce8d719

Author

Listed:
  • Cardella, Eric
  • Kugler, Tamar
  • Mao, Kyle

Abstract

Organizations implement competitive, tournament-style mechanisms to select and retain employees. Under “rank-and-yank” systems, management evaluates the productivity of a group of workers, ranks them relatively, and then terminates some fraction of the lowest-ranked employees. Using two experimental studies, we tested how rank-and-yank systems impact employees' future other-regarding behaviors. Study 1 employed a unique two-stage design where all participants first completed a real-effort work task under a competitive, tournament-based compensation scheme. In the second stage, participants completed a series of interactive decision tasks serving as proxies for different measures of other-regarding behavior. In a baseline condition, all participants were retained for stage 2. In the primary rank-and-yank condition, the lowest-ranked employees were yanked, while only the retained top-ranked employees competed in stage 2. We hypothesize that while rank-and-yank systems improve short-term task performance, they will generally lead to less other-regarding future behavior. Consistent with our hypothesis, in the rank-and-yank condition, relative to the baseline, we observed evidence of (i) increased productivity in the initial task, but decreased other-regarding behavior in the form of (ii) decreased altruism, (iii) decreased cooperation, (iv) decreased trust and trustworthiness, and (v) increased sabotage behaviors. In Study 2, we examined potential mechanisms and found strong evidence that survivors of rank-and-yank perceived others as less other-regarding, more entitled, and more likely to have cheated to earn their performance rank.

Suggested Citation

  • Cardella, Eric & Kugler, Tamar & Mao, Kyle, 2026. "Spillover effects from competitive rank-and-yank systems on employees' other-regarding behavior11Authors have contributed equally and are listed alphabetically. We thank seminar participants at the University of Arizona and Texas Tech University, and," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 115(C).
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:joepsy:v:115:y:2026:i:c:s0167487026000437
    DOI: 10.1016/j.joep.2026.102919
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