UK Food standards agency proposals for re-structuring how it regulates food-borne risks: an analysis and critique

Official food policy-makers are expected both to ensure that they have a well-functioning system of food supply, processing, distribution and consumption while also ensuring that their citizens are protected from unsafe and unhealthy foods. It is evident that the implications of those two responsibilities can and sometimes do conflict; which historically has prompted the question: should those two policy responsibilities be institutionally co-located, or institutionally separated? The UK’s Food Standards Agency (FSA) was created in response to the policy failures revealed by the Mad Cow Disease saga. Previously one UK ministry had been responsible for both agendas, but the tension between them had been so severe that they contributed to turning the saga into a deep crisis. Responsibility for ensuring UK food safety was subsequently separated from the food industries’ sponsoring ministry, and transferred to the FSA. A recent set of proposals from the FSA recommends that the agency should expand its responsibilities by also endeavouring to promote the commercial interests of the food industries. Implementing the proposals risks undermining public confidence in the FSA and the safety of the UK’s food supply. The significance of the proposals goes beyond the UK as it illustrates a pivotal and ubiquitous axis of contestation in food policy-making, it illustrates ways in which food policy governance can be malleable rather than rigid, and explains how a combination of forgetfulness and economic re-prioritisation risks undermining food safety and public trust in policy-making.