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Anticipating binding constraints: An analysis of debt covenants

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  • Teoh, Ken

Abstract

This paper shows that anticipation can meaningfully impact inferences about the effects of covenant violations. Using textual analysis of SEC filings and earnings call transcripts, I construct a measure of covenant concerns that identifies instances where firms disclose forward-looking risks related to their debt covenants. On average, nearly 30 percent of U.S. non-financial firms report covenant concerns each year. While the real effects of covenant violations are robust for most outcomes, the estimated impact of some variables, including cash acquisitions, default risk, and credit line availability, can be overstated. This finding highlights the importance of selection around violation: firms that anticipate and successfully avoid violations differ systematically from firms that fail to avoid them.

Suggested Citation

  • Teoh, Ken, 2025. "Anticipating binding constraints: An analysis of debt covenants," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 63(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jfinin:v:63:y:2025:i:c:s1042957325000282
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jfi.2025.101160
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G31 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Capital Budgeting; Fixed Investment and Inventory Studies
    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill

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