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Power plays in the jungle: Political alignment and environmental degradation in Colombia

Author

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  • Jimenez, Juan Miguel
  • Molina Alvarez, Lizeth Melissa
  • Saavedra, Santiago

Abstract

We examine how political dynamics shape environmental outcomes in Colombia, focusing on the role of Regional Environmental Protection Agencies (REPAs). To identify causal effects, we implement a regression discontinuity design based on close mayoral elections. Our results show that when governors—who sit on REPA boards—are politically aligned with local mayors, annual deforestation increases by 0.044 percentage points, or about 40 percent relative to the mean. The problem is most pronounced in agencies where political actors dominate decision-making. Crucially, additional deforestation does not translate into local economic gains, suggesting that forests are being lost without broader social benefits. These findings highlight how decentralized institutional design can leave environmental governance vulnerable to political capture, underscoring the need for safeguards in the governance structure of environmental authorities to protect natural resources from short-term political interests.

Suggested Citation

  • Jimenez, Juan Miguel & Molina Alvarez, Lizeth Melissa & Saavedra, Santiago, 2026. "Power plays in the jungle: Political alignment and environmental degradation in Colombia," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 138(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jeeman:v:138:y:2026:i:c:s0095069626000550
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jeem.2026.103335
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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • P48 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Other Economic Systems - - - Legal Institutions; Property Rights; Natural Resources; Energy; Environment; Regional Studies
    • Q23 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Forestry

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