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Sanctions without sanctimony: Why do states impose sanctions?

Author

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  • D’Amico, Daniel J.
  • Tilley, Cameron
  • Ammons, Joshua D.
  • Wilhelm, Eric H.

Abstract

We examine the political and economic effects of sanctions against their stated goals to justify them. We find null or negative effects on every outcome that we test. Given the ubiquity and persistence of economic sanctions as international policy tools, and given the substantial costs of designing, maintaining, and enforcing sanctions, this seems paradoxical. Why would contemporary nation states impose sanctions with no discernibly beneficial effects? We highlight the behavioral complexity inherent to the context of international relations as a viable explanation for sanctions’ lack of measurable efficacy. Designing and enforcing effective sanctions with precision and accuracy is a tangibly more complex challenge beyond conventional punitive deterrence. Using public choice analysis, we explain how sanctions benefit certain special interests and government authorities. The persistent use of these economic tools for statecraft can ultimately be explained by public choice.

Suggested Citation

  • D’Amico, Daniel J. & Tilley, Cameron & Ammons, Joshua D. & Wilhelm, Eric H., 2026. "Sanctions without sanctimony: Why do states impose sanctions?," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 248(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:248:y:2026:i:c:s0167268126001915
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2026.107605
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