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When bacteria and physicians play public good games

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  • Antoci, Angelo
  • Borghesi, Simone
  • Delpini, Danilo
  • Russu, Paolo

Abstract

Antimicrobial resistance (AMR) is increasingly recognized as a global public health crisis arising from the interaction between biological processes and human behavior. This paper develops a dynamic model of the strategic interplay between physicians’ prescribing decisions and the evolution of bacterial resistance over time. Physicians face an intertemporal trade-off between responsible prescribing (i.e. in line with international “best practice” guidelines) and over-prescribing, which may generate short-term benefits for individual patients but accelerates the emergence and spread of resistance. Since the costs of resistance are diffuse and delayed, whereas the benefits of over-prescribing are immediate and privately appropriated, AMR constitutes a behavioral public-good problem prone to collective action failure.

Suggested Citation

  • Antoci, Angelo & Borghesi, Simone & Delpini, Danilo & Russu, Paolo, 2026. "When bacteria and physicians play public good games," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 245(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:245:y:2026:i:c:s016726812600096x
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2026.107510
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