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Government transparency and tax compliance: Evidence from an artefactual experiment supplemented with administrative data

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  • McNamara, Trent
  • Mosquera, Roberto

Abstract

Effective tax policy requires understanding behavioral decision-making. We investigate reciprocity and whether misperceptions about how the government allocates funds impacts taxpaying behaviors. In an artefactual survey experiment supplemented with administrative tax payment data from 2,000 self-employed workers, preferences and beliefs on government spending are elicited. In the case when revealing the actual distribution improves beliefs relative to preferences, government support increases (0.30 s.d.), views on taxes improve (0.24 s.d.), and affective polarization decreases (0.40 s.d.). However, there is no effect on reported income tax. When beliefs are worsened relative to preferences, there is no significant response on stated outcomes, but we find an increase in reported income tax.

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  • McNamara, Trent & Mosquera, Roberto, 2025. "Government transparency and tax compliance: Evidence from an artefactual experiment supplemented with administrative data," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 236(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:236:y:2025:i:c:s0167268125001611
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107042
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    JEL classification:

    • D60 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - General
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
    • D90 - Microeconomics - - Micro-Based Behavioral Economics - - - General
    • H26 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Tax Evasion and Avoidance

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