Director turnover in new venture boards: From homophilous to resource-contingent processes

While resource-dependency theories suggest that heterogenous directors in new venture boards contribute important knowledge and networks, research on boardroom homophily highlights that dissimilar directors are more likely to leave, especially under adverse conditions. To date, there is limited evidence on whether such mechanisms also prevail in the venture context where founder-managers retain excessive control over director appointments. We analyze director tenure in 28,295 Swedish ventures, finding that dissimilar directors are more likely to leave the board when ventures are operating in favorable conditions but only when considering knowledge diversity. Post-hoc analyses of directors' post-exit career paths and qualitative interviews with CEOs and directors help clarify the mechanisms that cause diverse directors to depart venture boards more often. Specifically, lifecycle demands and venture profitability ease resource-dependence pressures on director retention, thus feeding homogeneity in board expertise. Our findings provide insights into the homogenizing nature of new ventures' upper echelons as they evolve into mature organizations.