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How executives’ long-termism shapes ESG performance: dual-channel shareholder governance

Author

Listed:
  • Xu, Ning
  • Zhang, Di
  • Liu, Guangjian
  • Wang, Shujun

Abstract

This study investigates the impact of executives’ long-termism on the environmental, social, and governance (ESG) performance of enterprises and the moderating effects of two distinct shareholder governance mechanisms: minority shareholder activism (the bottom-up influence) and common institutional ownership (the outside-in influence). Using a dataset of Chinese A-share listed companies from 2013 to 2021, we find that executives’ long-termism positively affects corporate ESG performance, and the relationship is strengthened by minority shareholder activism and common institutional ownership. By conceptualizing managerial long-termism as a form of temporal cognition, this study advances ESG research by identifying a critical microfoundation of sustainable strategic behavior. Moreover, it extends behavioral agency theory by incorporating heterogeneity in managers’ time preferences and clarifies how internal managerial cognition interacts with external governance mechanisms to drive firms’ ESG outcomes.

Suggested Citation

  • Xu, Ning & Zhang, Di & Liu, Guangjian & Wang, Shujun, 2026. "How executives’ long-termism shapes ESG performance: dual-channel shareholder governance," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 210(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jbrese:v:210:y:2026:i:c:s0148296326002109
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jbusres.2026.116175
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