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The inevitable disclosure doctrine: A facade or a curse in the CEO labor market

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  • Fung, Hung-Gay
  • Li, Tongxia
  • Lu, Chun
  • Wen, Min-Ming

Abstract

Our study examines how the adoption of the inevitable disclosure doctrine (IDD) across US state courts affects the relationship between leverage and CEO compensation. We find that the IDD adoption significantly attenuates the typically positive association between leverage and CEO pay. This effect is more pronounced for CEOs with higher ex-ante mobility, greater career concerns, weaker organizational influence, and higher firm-specific skills. Rejecting the IDD, on the other hand, amplifies the positive relationship between leverage and CEO pay. Our findings underscore the influence of labor market dynamics on CEO compensation.

Suggested Citation

  • Fung, Hung-Gay & Li, Tongxia & Lu, Chun & Wen, Min-Ming, 2025. "The inevitable disclosure doctrine: A facade or a curse in the CEO labor market," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 179(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jbfina:v:179:y:2025:i:c:s0378426625001608
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jbankfin.2025.107540
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    JEL classification:

    • G30 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - General
    • G38 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • J60 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - General
    • M12 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Administration - - - Personnel Management; Executives; Executive Compensation

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