Economic consequences of increasing the conformity in accounting for uncertain tax benefits
Commentary during the development of FASB Interpretation no. 48 suggests the interpretation could be costly for firms because new disclosure requirements could be used by the IRS to more effectively challenge uncertain tax positions. Stock returns around FIN 48 pronouncements suggest investors were not concerned about an increase in tax costs, and investors responded favorably to initial disclosures required under FIN 48. However, we document a significant negative market reaction to subsequent news of a Senate inquiry into these disclosures consistent with investors revising their beliefs over the potential for additional tax costs.
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- Mihir A. Desai & Dhammika Dharmapala, 2004.
"Corporate Tax Avoidance and High Powered Incentives,"
2004-09, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics.
- Desai, Mihir A. & Dharmapala, Dhammika, 2006. "Corporate tax avoidance and high-powered incentives," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 79(1), pages 145-179, January.
- Mihir A. Desai & Dhammika Dharmapala, 2004. "Corporate Tax Avoidance and High Powered Incentives," NBER Working Papers 10471, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Mihir Desai & Dhammika Dharmapala, . "Corporate Tax Avoidance and High Powered Incentives," American Law & Economics Association Annual Meetings 1006, American Law & Economics Association.
- Mihir A. Desai, 2003. "The Divergence between Book Income and Tax Income," NBER Chapters, in: Tax Policy and the Economy, Volume 17, pages 169-208 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Hanlon, Michelle, 2003. "What Can We Infer about a Firm’s Taxable Income from Its Financial Statements?," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association, vol. 56(4), pages 831-63, December.
- Espahbodi, Hassan & Espahbodi, Pouran & Rezaee, Zabihollah & Tehranian, Hassan, 2002. "Stock price reaction and value relevance of recognition versus disclosure: the case of stock-based compensation," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 33(3), pages 343-373, August.
- Verrecchia, Robert E., 2001. "Essays on disclosure," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(1-3), pages 97-180, December.
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