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Monitoring roles of CEO-directors: Evidence from corporate misconduct

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  • Jun, Tae In

Abstract

Using conventional monitoring proxies, prior studies provide mixed evidence on whether independent directors who are chief executive officers of other firms (CEO-directors) are effective monitors. Using federal-level violations, a measure that extends traditional monitoring proxies by capturing corporate activities beyond headquarters, we find that boards with a higher proportion of CEO-directors are associated with more frequent and severe corporate misconduct. Further analyses suggest that these patterns reflect attention constraints arising from CEO-directors' busyness, spillovers of governance practices from their primary employers, and board dynamics related to CEO power. Our findings indicate that independent directors with different backgrounds contribute to board oversight in heterogeneous ways.

Suggested Citation

  • Jun, Tae In, 2026. "Monitoring roles of CEO-directors: Evidence from corporate misconduct," Global Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 71(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:glofin:v:71:y:2026:i:c:s1044028326000396
    DOI: 10.1016/j.gfj.2026.101271
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    JEL classification:

    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance

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