Auction choice for ambiguity-averse sellers facing strategic uncertainty: Comment
This note demonstrates epsilon equilibria in the first-price auction that achieve lower worst-case expected revenues than the lower bound proposed by Turocy (2008) (Auction choice for ambiguity-averse sellers facing strategic uncertainty, Games Econ. Behav. 62 (2008) 155-179). Additionally, it stresses the importance of a careful specification of the action space to properly characterize expected revenues when bidders systematically deviate from equilibrium play.
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