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Auction choice for ambiguity-averse sellers facing strategic uncertainty: Comment


  • Kotowski, Maciej H.


This note demonstrates epsilon equilibria in the first-price auction that achieve lower worst-case expected revenues than the lower bound proposed by Turocy (2008) (Auction choice for ambiguity-averse sellers facing strategic uncertainty, Games Econ. Behav. 62 (2008) 155-179). Additionally, it stresses the importance of a careful specification of the action space to properly characterize expected revenues when bidders systematically deviate from equilibrium play.

Suggested Citation

  • Kotowski, Maciej H., 2011. "Auction choice for ambiguity-averse sellers facing strategic uncertainty: Comment," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 72(2), pages 448-451, June.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:72:y:2011:i:2:p:448-451

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