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Honor, Symbols, and War: By Barry O'Neill, University of Michigan Press, 1999

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  • Gilboa, Itzhak

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  • Gilboa, Itzhak, 2004. "Honor, Symbols, and War: By Barry O'Neill, University of Michigan Press, 1999," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 213-214, January.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:46:y:2004:i:1:p:213-214
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Antonio Romero-Medina, 1998. "Implementation of stable solutions in a restricted matching market," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, pages 137-147.
    2. Alcalde, Jose, 1996. "Implementation of Stable Solutions to Marriage Problems," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, pages 240-254.
    3. Perez-Castrillo J. David, 1994. "Cooperative Outcomes through Noncooperative Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, pages 428-440.
    4. Roth, Alvin E., 1984. "Misrepresentation and stability in the marriage problem," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, pages 383-387.
    5. Serrano Roberto, 1995. "A Market to Implement the Core," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, pages 285-294.
    6. Alcalde, Jose & Romero-Medina, Antonio, 2000. "Simple Mechanisms to Implement the Core of College Admissions Problems," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, pages 294-302.
    7. Roth, Alvin E, 1984. "Stability and Polarization of Interests in Job Matching," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(1), pages 47-57, January.
    8. Tayfun Sönmez & Tarik Kara, 1997. "Implementation of college admission rules (*)," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), pages 197-218.
    9. Perez-Castrillo, David & Sotomayor, Marilda, 2002. "A Simple Selling and Buying Procedure," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, pages 461-474.
    10. Alcalde, Jose & Perez-Castrillo, David & Romero-Medina, Antonio, 1998. "Hiring Procedures to Implement Stable Allocations," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, pages 469-480.
    11. Perez-Castrillo J. David, 1994. "Cooperative Outcomes through Noncooperative Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, pages 428-440.
    12. Roth, Alvin E., 1985. "The college admissions problem is not equivalent to the marriage problem," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, pages 277-288.
    13. Kamecke, U, 1989. "Non-cooperative Matching Games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, pages 423-431.
    14. José Alcalde, 1995. "Implementation of Stable Solutions to Marriage Problems," Working Papers. Serie AD 1995-05, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
    15. Sotomayor, Marilda, 1999. "Three remarks on the many-to-many stable matching problem," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, pages 55-70.
    16. José Alcalde Pérez & Antonio Romero-Medina & David Pérez-Castrillo, 1997. "Hiring procedures to implement stable allocations," Working Papers. Serie AD 1997-10, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
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