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The effort-maximizing move order in tullock contests

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  • Gao, Lei
  • Lu, Jingfeng
  • Wang, Zhewei

Abstract

This paper examines effort-maximizing move orders in two-player Tullock contests across varying levels of contest accuracy and player asymmetries. Unlike prior work that favors strong-lead sequential formats in lottery contests, our analysis demonstrates that all three formats—strong-lead, weak-lead, and simultaneous—can be optimal in the general Tullock contests. Strong-lead contests are most effective in noisy environments, but lose their advantage as contest accuracy increases. Weak-lead contests may become optimal when the weaker player successfully preempts. Simultaneous-move contests tend to perform better as the players’ ability differences become less severe. Overall, the optimal contest design jointly depends on the contest accuracy levels and relative strengths of the contestants.

Suggested Citation

  • Gao, Lei & Lu, Jingfeng & Wang, Zhewei, 2026. "The effort-maximizing move order in tullock contests," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 158(C), pages 622-629.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:158:y:2026:i:c:p:622-629
    DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2026.05.005
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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
    • D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty

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