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The case for lobbying transparency

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  • Zerbini, Antoine

Abstract

Lobbying transparency regulations are hailed as a potential solution to concerns about the excessive influence of special interest groups (SIGs) over policymaking. I study how these regulations shape strategic interactions between voters, politicians and SIGs. By clarifying the process through which a policy was implemented, lobbying transparency helps voters hold politicians accountable and control the influence of SIGs. Ex-post, conditional on access, SIGs prefer to operate without lobbying transparency. Ex-ante, they may benefit from lobbying transparency because it redirects the voters’ blame towards politicians. However, lobbying transparency standards may ultimately hurt the electoral prospects of politicians and thus risk never being implemented, potentially explaining why voters’ demand for it remains unanswered.

Suggested Citation

  • Zerbini, Antoine, 2026. "The case for lobbying transparency," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 158(C), pages 272-282.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:158:y:2026:i:c:p:272-282
    DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2026.02.012
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    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • P35 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Socialist Institutions and Their Transitions - - - Public Finance
    • D02 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact

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