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Algorithms and complexity for computing Nash equilibria in adversarial team games

Author

Listed:
  • Anagnostides, Ioannis
  • Kalogiannis, Fivos
  • Panageas, Ioannis
  • Vlatakis-Gkaragkounis, Emmanouil-Vasileios
  • Mcaleer, Stephen

Abstract

Adversarial team games model multiplayer strategic interactions in which a team of identically-interested players is competing against an adversarial player in a zero-sum game. Such games capture many well-studied settings in game theory, such as congestion games, but go well-beyond to environments wherein the cooperation of one team—in the absence of explicit communication—is obstructed by competing entities; the latter setting remains poorly understood despite its numerous applications. Since the seminal work of Von Stengel and Koller (GEB ‘97), different solution concepts have received attention from an algorithmic standpoint. Yet, the complexity of the standard Nash equilibrium has remained open.

Suggested Citation

  • Anagnostides, Ioannis & Kalogiannis, Fivos & Panageas, Ioannis & Vlatakis-Gkaragkounis, Emmanouil-Vasileios & Mcaleer, Stephen, 2026. "Algorithms and complexity for computing Nash equilibria in adversarial team games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 157(C), pages 138-152.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:157:y:2026:i:c:p:138-152
    DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2026.01.006
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    References listed on IDEAS

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