Author
Listed:
- Qin, Xian
- Zhang, Wei
- Zhang, Feiteng
- Cheng, Fang
Abstract
Collective forestland, which has both economic and ecological value, is increasingly attracting the attention of social capital. However, under large-scale operations driven by forestland transfer, the challenge of unequal benefit distribution undermines the sustainability of these initiatives, and current research pays insufficient academic attention to the fairness of distribution. To establish a more equitable approach, we applied a cooperative game framework based on an improved Shapley value to redesign the benefit-sharing mechanism. Unlike the traditional Shapley value model, which assumes equal investment and risk sharing among participants, the improved model incorporates stakeholders' relative contributions and risk tolerance levels to optimize the benefit-sharing mechanism between forest enterprises and households. Using to an empirical case study in Taian City, China, our approach demonstrates the outcomes of alliance formation and income distribution. The findings reveal that a fair distribution scheme based on the Shapley value significantly increases forest households' incomes while enhancing operational efficiency in large-scale forest management. Our results identify several practical issues in current forestland transfer policies that require urgent attention, and propose a replicable institutional model for the redistribution of benefits in collective forest property rights reforms, offering operational solutions for enhancing fairness.
Suggested Citation
Qin, Xian & Zhang, Wei & Zhang, Feiteng & Cheng, Fang, 2026.
"Fair benefit distribution in forestland transfer with social capital participation in China: An improved Shapley value approach,"
Forest Policy and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 192(C).
Handle:
RePEc:eee:forpol:v:192:y:2026:i:c:s1389934126002285
DOI: 10.1016/j.forpol.2026.103922
Download full text from publisher
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to
for a different version of it.
Corrections
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:forpol:v:192:y:2026:i:c:s1389934126002285. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/forpol .
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through
the various RePEc services.