IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/finsta/v81y2025ics1572308925001093.html

Debt maturity, creditor rights, and capital allocation efficiency: Evidence from quasi-natural experiments in India

Author

Listed:
  • Sahoo, Jyoti Ranjan
  • Mishra, Ajay Kumar

Abstract

This study investigates the impact of India’s Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (IBC) on capital allocation efficiency among firms with higher long-term debt maturity. Using a difference-in-differences framework on a panel of listed firms from 2010 to 2021, the analysis examines how strengthened creditor rights under the IBC have influenced firms’ investment behavior, particularly those with greater long-term debt exposure. The results show that the implementation of the IBC significantly enhanced capital allocation efficiency by mitigating both underinvestment and overinvestment. Overall, the results suggest that the reform improved firms’ financial decision-making and contributed to greater capital market stability in India. The results remain robust across alternative model specifications and controls for firm, industry, and time-specific effects.

Suggested Citation

  • Sahoo, Jyoti Ranjan & Mishra, Ajay Kumar, 2025. "Debt maturity, creditor rights, and capital allocation efficiency: Evidence from quasi-natural experiments in India," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 81(C).
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:finsta:v:81:y:2025:i:c:s1572308925001093
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jfs.2025.101480
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1572308925001093
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1016/j.jfs.2025.101480?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to

    for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Diamond, Douglas W, 1991. "Monitoring and Reputation: The Choice between Bank Loans and Directly Placed Debt," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 99(4), pages 689-721, August.
    2. Favara, Giovanni & Morellec, Erwan & Schroth, Enrique & Valta, Philip, 2017. "Debt enforcement, investment, and risk taking across countries," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 123(1), pages 22-41.
    3. Guedes, Jose & Opler, Tim, 1996. "The Determinants of the Maturity of Corporate Debt Issues," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 51(5), pages 1809-1833, December.
    4. Myers, Stewart C. & Majluf, Nicholas S., 1984. "Corporate financing and investment decisions when firms have information that investors do not have," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 13(2), pages 187-221, June.
    5. Prasanna L Tantri, 2018. "Contagious Effects of a Political Intervention in Debt Contracts: Evidence Using Loan-Level Data," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 31(11), pages 4556-4592.
    6. Biddle, Gary C. & Hilary, Gilles & Verdi, Rodrigo S., 2009. "How does financial reporting quality relate to investment efficiency?," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 48(2-3), pages 112-131, December.
    7. Thapa, Chandra & Rao, Sandeep & Farag, Hisham & Koirala, Santosh, 2020. "Access to internal capital, creditor rights and corporate borrowing: Does group affiliation matter?," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 62(C).
    8. Djankov, Simeon & McLiesh, Caralee & Shleifer, Andrei, 2007. "Private credit in 129 countries," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 84(2), pages 299-329, May.
    9. Vikrant Vig, 2013. "Access to Collateral and Corporate Debt Structure: Evidence from a Natural Experiment," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 68(3), pages 881-928, June.
    10. M. S. Sahoo & Anuradha Guru, 2020. "Indian Insolvency Law," Vikalpa: The Journal for Decision Makers, , vol. 45(2), pages 69-78, June.
    11. Müge Adalet McGowan & Dan Andrews & Valentine Millot & Thorsten BeckManaging Editor, 2018. "The walking dead? Zombie firms and productivity performance in OECD countries," Economic Policy, CEPR, CESifo, Sciences Po;CES;MSH, vol. 33(96), pages 685-736.
    12. Rajeswari Sengupta & Anjali Sharma & Susan Thomas, 2016. "Evolution of the insolvency framework for non-financial firms in India," Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research, Mumbai Working Papers 2016-018, Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research, Mumbai, India.
    13. Jibin Jose & Snehal S. Herwadkar & Prabal Bilantu & Shihas Abdul Razak, 2020. "Does Greater Creditor Protection Affect Firm Borrowings? Evidence from IBC," Margin: The Journal of Applied Economic Research, National Council of Applied Economic Research, vol. 14(2), pages 212-225, May.
    14. Ranjeet Singh & Nemiraja Jadiyappa & Garima Sisodia, 2021. "Bankruptcy law, creditors’ rights and financing choices: Evidence from a quasi-natural experiment in India," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 53(52), pages 6036-6042, November.
    15. R. Glenn Hubbard, 1998. "Capital-Market Imperfections and Investment," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 36(1), pages 193-225, March.
    16. Araujo, Aloisio P. & Ferreira, Rafael V.X. & Funchal, Bruno, 2012. "The Brazilian bankruptcy law experience," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 18(4), pages 994-1004.
    17. Espen Eckbo, B. & Thorburn, Karin S., 2003. "Control benefits and CEO discipline in automatic bankruptcy auctions," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 69(1), pages 227-258, July.
    18. Stiglitz, Joseph E & Weiss, Andrew, 1981. "Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 71(3), pages 393-410, June.
    19. Ho, Kung-Cheng & Yan, Cheng & Mao, Zhicheng & An, Jiafu, 2023. "Corporate sustainability policies and corporate investment efficiency: Evidence from the quasi-natural experiment in China," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 127(PB).
    20. Stulz, ReneM., 1990. "Managerial discretion and optimal financing policies," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 26(1), pages 3-27, July.
    21. Daher, Mai, 2017. "Creditor control rights, capital structure, and legal enforcement," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 44(C), pages 308-330.
    22. Singh, Ranjeet & Chauhan, Yogesh & Jadiyappa, Nemiraja, 2022. "Bankruptcy reform and corporate risk-taking: Evidence from a quasi-natural experiment," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, vol. 47(PB).
    23. Roberts, Michael R. & Sufi, Amir, 2009. "Renegotiation of financial contracts: Evidence from private credit agreements," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 93(2), pages 159-184, August.
    24. Saibal Ghosh, 2023. "Creditor rights and lending relationships," Applied Economics Letters, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 30(9), pages 1194-1198, May.
    25. Agarwal, Shivangi & Singhvi, Bhavya, 2023. "Creditor-controlled insolvency and firm financing– Evidence from India," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, vol. 54(C).
    26. Jensen, Michael C, 1986. "Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(2), pages 323-329, May.
    27. Zwiebel, Jeffrey, 1995. "Corporate Conservatism and Relative Compensation," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 103(1), pages 1-25, February.
    28. Rodano, Giacomo & Serrano-Velarde, Nicolas & Tarantino, Emanuele, 2016. "Bankruptcy law and bank financing," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 120(2), pages 363-382.
    29. Radhakrishnan Gopalan & Abhiroop Mukherjee & Manpreet Singh, 2016. "Do Debt Contract Enforcement Costs Affect Financing and Asset Structure?," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 29(10), pages 2774-2813.
    30. Edward I. Altman, 1968. "Financial Ratios, Discriminant Analysis And The Prediction Of Corporate Bankruptcy," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 23(4), pages 589-609, September.
    31. Hart, Oliver, 1995. "Firms, Contracts, and Financial Structure," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780198288817.
    32. Andrew Winton, 2003. "Institutional Liquidity Needs and the Structure of Monitored Finance," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 16(4), pages 1273-1313.
    33. Bose, Udichibarna & Filomeni, Stefano & Mallick, Sushanta, 2021. "Does bankruptcy law improve the fate of distressed firms? The role of credit channels," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 68(C).
    34. D'Mello, Ranjan & Miranda, Mercedes, 2010. "Long-term debt and overinvestment agency problem," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 34(2), pages 324-335, February.
    35. Branch, Ben & Khizer, Abdul, 2016. "Bankruptcy practice in India," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 47(C), pages 1-6.
    36. Sudip Datta & Mai Iskandar‐Datta & Kartik Raman, 2005. "Managerial Stock Ownership and the Maturity Structure of Corporate Debt," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 60(5), pages 2333-2350, October.
    37. Nini, Greg & Smith, David C. & Sufi, Amir, 2009. "Creditor control rights and firm investment policy," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 92(3), pages 400-420, June.
    38. Jun Qian & Philip E. Strahan, 2007. "How Laws and Institutions Shape Financial Contracts: The Case of Bank Loans," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 62(6), pages 2803-2834, December.
    39. Giannetti, Mariassunta, 2003. "Do Better Institutions Mitigate Agency Problems? Evidence from Corporate Finance Choices," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 38(1), pages 185-212, March.
    40. Sudheer Chava & Michael R. Roberts, 2008. "How Does Financing Impact Investment? The Role of Debt Covenants," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 63(5), pages 2085-2121, October.
    41. Ranjeet Singh & Yogesh Chauhan & Nemiraja Jadiyappa, 2023. "Does an effective bankruptcy reform increases collateralized borrowing? Evidence from a quasi-natural experiment in India," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 63(1), pages 74-86, April.
    42. Hayashi, Fumio, 1982. "Tobin's Marginal q and Average q: A Neoclassical Interpretation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(1), pages 213-224, January.
    43. Myers, Stewart C., 1977. "Determinants of corporate borrowing," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 5(2), pages 147-175, November.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Bose, Udichibarna & Filomeni, Stefano & Mallick, Sushanta, 2021. "Does bankruptcy law improve the fate of distressed firms? The role of credit channels," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 68(C).
    2. Srivastava, Aaraadhya, 2025. "Creditor rights and innovation: evidence from a quasi-natural experiment," Journal of Contemporary Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 21(3).
    3. Cutillas Gomariz, Mª Fuensanta & Sánchez Ballesta, Juan Pedro, 2014. "Financial reporting quality, debt maturity and investment efficiency," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 40(C), pages 494-506.
    4. Vikas Mehrotra & Randall Morck, 2017. "Governance and Stakeholders," NBER Working Papers 23460, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    5. A Srivastava, 2024. "Bankruptcy Law, Creditor Rights, and Earnings Management: Evidence from India," Economic Issues Journal Articles, Economic Issues, vol. 29(2), pages 77-100, September.
    6. Juan Pedro Sánchez Ballesta & M. Fuensanta Cutillas Gomariz, 2012. "Financial reporting quality, debt maturity and investment efficiency," Working Papers. Serie EC 2012-07, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
    7. Agarwal, Shivangi & Singhvi, Bhavya, 2023. "Creditor-controlled insolvency and firm financing– Evidence from India," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, vol. 54(C).
    8. González, Francisco, 2020. "Creditor rights, financial health, and corporate investment efficiency," The North American Journal of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 51(C).
    9. Closset, Frédéric & Großmann, Christoph & Kaserer, Christoph & Urban, Daniel, 2023. "Corporate restructuring and creditor power: Evidence from European insolvency law reforms," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 149(C).
    10. Awartani, Basel & Belkhir, Mohamed & Boubaker, Sabri & Maghyereh, Aktham, 2016. "Corporate debt maturity in the MENA region: Does institutional quality matter?," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 46(C), pages 309-325.
    11. Xin Qu & Majella Percy & Fang Hu & Jenny Stewart, 2022. "Can CEO equity‐based compensation limit investment‐related agency problems?," Accounting and Finance, Accounting and Finance Association of Australia and New Zealand, vol. 62(2), pages 2579-2614, June.
    12. He Xiao, 2023. "Institutional investors' corporate site visits and corporate investment efficiency," International Review of Finance, International Review of Finance Ltd., vol. 23(2), pages 359-392, June.
    13. Driss, Hamdi & Drobetz, Wolfgang & El Ghoul, Sadok & Guedhami, Omrane, 2021. "Institutional investment horizons, corporate governance, and credit ratings: International evidence," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 67(C).
    14. Singh, Ranjeet & Chauhan, Yogesh & Jadiyappa, Nemiraja, 2022. "Bankruptcy reform and corporate risk-taking: Evidence from a quasi-natural experiment," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, vol. 47(PB).
    15. Nazari, Jamal A. & Poursoleyman, Ehsan, 2025. "Beyond the tipping point: The nonlinear impact of material sustainability on investment efficiency," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 101(C).
    16. Morais, Flávio & Serrasqueiro, Zélia & Ramalho, Joaquim J.S., 2020. "The zero-leverage phenomenon: A bivariate probit with partial observability approach," Research in International Business and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 53(C).
    17. Gopalakrishnan, Balagopal & Mohapatra, Sanket, 2020. "Insolvency regimes and firms' default risk under economic uncertainty and shocks," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 91(C), pages 180-197.
    18. Asiri, Mohammed & Al-Hadi, Ahmed & Taylor, Grantley & Duong, Lien, 2020. "Is corporate tax avoidance associated with investment efficiency?," The North American Journal of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 52(C).
    19. Ivan E. Brick & Rose C. Liao, 2017. "The joint determinants of cash holdings and debt maturity: the case for financial constraints," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 48(3), pages 597-641, April.
    20. Gao, Peng & He, Ling & Hu, Shiyang & Xin, Qingquan, 2024. "Double-edged sword: Does strong creditor protection in the bankruptcy process affect firm productivity," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 95(PA).

    More about this item

    Keywords

    ;
    ;
    ;
    ;
    ;

    JEL classification:

    • G31 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Capital Budgeting; Fixed Investment and Inventory Studies
    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
    • G33 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Bankruptcy; Liquidation
    • G38 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Government Policy and Regulation

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:finsta:v:81:y:2025:i:c:s1572308925001093. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jfstabil .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.