In this paper, I shall briefly discuss five issues: (1) the 'collective action' problem, whereby bankers have an incentive to herd together; (2) the provision of central bank liquidity insurance; notably the time consistency and stigma concerns; (3) clarifying the objectives of central bank operations; (4) whether to 'lean against the wind' of credit cycles; (5) the macro-economic backdrop and preconditions for financial-system stabilisation.
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