User refueling choice behavior of hydrogen fuel cell vehicles and economic optimization of hydrogen stations under multi-stakeholder multi-layer game model

In the ongoing integration of electricity and carbon markets and the decarbonization of the transportation sector, the increasing adoption of hydrogen fuel cell vehicle (HFCV) has driven the development of hydrogen production and refueling station (HPRS). Beyond their traditional role as refueling service providers, HPRSs act as profit-driven hydrogen suppliers with electricity-intensive production processes. This operational characteristic enables HPRSs, as distribution-level loads, to actively participate in the carbon market and the demand response (DR) market, thus enhancing their economic performance. This engagement creates a complex network of interactions among the distribution system operator (DSO), HPRS, and HFCV users. To address the associated challenges, this paper constructs a multi-layer game model for HFCV dispatch based on demand-side power bidding. The model incorporates an evolutionary game that enables HFCV users to independently select HPRS, a Stackelberg game for strategic optimization between HPRS and HFCVs, and a non-cooperative game facilitating competition among different HPRS in the DR market organized by DSO. By analyzing the utilities and constraints of each participant, the study develops an algorithm specifically designed to solve this multi-layer game model. Case studies validate that this method effectively coordinates the interactive benefits among the DSO, HPRS, and HFCVs, leading to a significant increase in revenue.