Can government supervision ensure compliance by photovoltaic enterprises? An evolutionary game analysis

Household photovoltaic (PV) power generation, as an important form of distributed renewable energy, plays an irreplaceable role in promoting energy transformation and achieving carbon neutrality. However, regulatory violations by PV enterprises have significantly hindered the adoption of household PVs. Despite this, research on supervisory enforcement and compliance remains limited. Accordingly, this study constructs a tripartite evolutionary game model involving households, PV enterprises, and the government, from the perspective of government supervision. We explored the evolutionary stability of the game system and conducted numerical simulations for some important parameters. The results showed that: (1) the tripartite game system may have four evolutionary stable states, with the violation strategy being the dominant strategy for PV enterprises; (2) increasing reputation loss can significantly deter violations by PV enterprises, whereas increasing fines and supervision intensity cannot fully eliminate them; (3) the government's strategy is influenced by revenue from violations, the intensity of violations, fines and supervision costs. Drawing on the research findings, this study proposes policy implications to strengthen regulatory oversight of PV enterprises and reduce non-compliant practices. This study offers critical insights for enhancing governmental regulatory frameworks in household PV system deployment, thereby promoting sustainable development of the industry.