Complexity analysis of automotive supply chains considering online reputation under dual policies

Facing dual pressures from sluggish consumer demand and the “dual‑carbon” goals, this study constructs a synergistic policy framework that integrates carbon quota trading and trade-in subsidies, while innovatively incorporating the dynamic effects of online reputation. Based on game theory and complex systems theory, we establish a manufacturer-led Stackelberg game model and a multi-period dynamic recursive model to unravel the coupling mechanisms through which policies and digital reputation influence supply chain decision-making. Our findings reveal that differentiated pricing strategies are a key driver of complex system dynamics: when traditional fuel vehicles (TFV) adopt conservative pricing v1<0.02 while new energy electric vehicles (NEEV) implement aggressive strategiesv3>0.16, the system exhibits asymmetric profit oscillations, with the Largest Lyapunov Exponent of 0.48, and the volatility of NEEV direct sales prices far exceeds that of retail channels. To address this, we propose a time-delayed feedback control method, which effectively suppresses chaotic phenomena and enhances the robustness of the supply chain system. These findings provide crucial theoretical foundation and practical insights for policy coordination, dynamic pricing, and stability management in automotive supply chains under the dual‑carbon targets.