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On managerial contracting with asymmetric information

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  • Ricart I Costa, Joan E.

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  • Ricart I Costa, Joan E., 1989. "On managerial contracting with asymmetric information," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 33(9), pages 1805-1829, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:33:y:1989:i:9:p:1805-1829
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    Cited by:

    1. Berck, Peter & Lipow, Jonathan, 1999. "Managerial reputation and the "endgame"," Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley, Working Paper Series qt7np2x55r, Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley.
    2. Berck, Peter & Lipow, Jonathan, 1999. "Managerial reputation and the "endgame"," CUDARE Working Papers 43912, University of California, Berkeley, Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics.
    3. Gregory Goering, 1994. "Managerial Incentives and Durable Goods Monopoly," International Journal of the Economics of Business, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 1(2), pages 271-282.
    4. Caruana, Guillermo & Celentani, Marco, 2001. "Career concerns and contingent compensation," UC3M Working papers. Economics we014811, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía.
    5. Berck, Peter & Lipow, Jonathan, 2000. "Managerial reputation and the 'endgame'," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 42(2), pages 253-263, June.
    6. Marco Celentani & Rosa Loveira-Pazó, 2004. "What form of relative performance evaluation?," Economics Working Papers 744, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.

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