How to incorporate coastal wetland blue carbon into China’s carbon market: Evolutionary game analysis on behavior strategies of multiple stakeholders

The restart of China’s Certified Emission Reduction (CCER) program has kicked off the establishment of a national carbon market that combines both mandatory and voluntary mechanisms. The incorporation of coastal wetland blue carbon into China’s carbon market to form a coastal wetland blue carbon trading market is an important supplement to the CCER trading system and helps meet the market demand for high-quality carbon sink projects. Coastal wetland blue carbon, as a public good, involves the interests of multiple stakeholders in its trading, making it a complex dynamic game process. This paper constructs a tripartite evolutionary game model involving the local government (LG), the coastal wetland blue carbon project developer (DCB) and the carbon emission reduction enterprise (CEE). Through simulation, this paper reveals the factors influencing the strategy choices of these stakeholders, aiming to increase their willingness to participate in blue carbon trading. The results show that the investment and postmaintenance costs of coastal wetland blue carbon project development are critical factors influencing the DCB’s strategy choice. The lag in the ex post allocation of carbon emission quotas affects the CEE’s willingness to purchase blue carbon. Furthermore, the blue carbon quota offset rate has a dual effect on system stability, requiring a dynamic balance with the project declaration costs. Finally, a policy of low subsidies for CEE combined with fines for excess carbon emissions, along with project development support for DCB, can help the system reach the ideal state. These findings provide references for promoting the incorporation of coastal wetland blue carbon into China’s carbon market.