A game-theoretic approach to community-based wildlife management in abandoned rural areas

Abandoned land in rural areas, characterized by declining human populations and shifting land uses, poses unique challenges for wildlife management. A prime example is Castilla (central Spain), where, in recent years, most rural areas have become depopulated and economically unviable. Since hunting estates in Spain occupy over 80% of the national surface and harbor most of the country’s wildlife, regulated hunting holds remarkable potential for new community-based conservation strategies that generate revenue for landowners while encouraging conservation. However, in most of Europe, open hunting estates are smaller than their wildlife’s home ranges, creating a dilemma for managers: long-term environmental interventions are risky because profitable trophies may roam away and be hunted elsewhere, leaving no return on the investment. A rational manager in this situation may consider neighboring estates as rivals and minimize investment while capitalizing on existing resources, leading to habitat degradation. We use game theory to find incentives that make long-term cooperation among neighboring estates attractive and stable. Shared-management coalitions of hunting estates can access high-end coordinated environmental interventions, boost biodiversity, healthier wildlife, and balanced populations. Moreover, coalitions reduce the economic impact of wildlife roaming, enjoy economies of scale, stimulate local job opportunities, generate revenue for individual estates and grow a “rainy-day” common fund. In our approach, a community norm emerges through “market forces” and incentives, circumventing a typical problem in community-based conservation, the lack of social cohesion in a group. Our results could contribute towards guiding the redirection of subsidies to optimize wildlife management.